OTTAWA, September 14, 2006
4214-13/4218-22
Pursuant to subsection 31(1) of the Special Import Measures Act, the President of the Canada Border Services Agency initiated an investigation on August 30, 2006, respecting the alleged injurious dumping of certain copper rod originating in or exported from Brazil and the Russian Federation and the alleged injurious subsidizing of certain copper rod originating in or exported from Brazil.
Copper rod with a diameter of at least 6 mm but not exceeding 11 mm, made to American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) designation B 49 or equivalent, originating in or exported from Brazil and the Russian Federation.
| 7408.11.11.00 | copper wire; of refined copper; of which the maximum cross-sectional dimension exceeds 6 mm; not exceeding 9.5 mm; not coated or covered. |
| 7408.11.20.10 | copper wire; of refined copper; exceeding 9.5 mm but not exceeding 12.7 mm; not coated or covered. |
Estimated Canadian Market Shares of Copper Rod
(excludes internal sales)
| 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
% share | % share | % share |
| Canadian “free market” sales (Nexans) | 95% | 77% | 50% |
| Brazil | 0 | 15% | 26% |
| Russia | 0 | 0 | 17% |
| USA | 5% | 8% | 7% |
| Total Imports | 5% | 23% | 50% |
| Total Market | 100% | 100% | 100% |
A) Price of copper per LME or COMEX
– Often based on the average for a specified month of shipment or other specified time frame
plus:
B) Cathode Premium
– The cost of transforming refined copper to cathode form, general and selling expenses including freight to customer, and profit to the cathode manufacturer
plus:
C) Rod Premium
– The cost of transforming copper cathode into rod form, general and selling expenses including freight to customer, and profit to the rod manufacturer
Estimated Volume of Dumped Goods as a Percentage of Total Import
January 1, 2005 to June 30, 2006
| Country | % of Total Imports | Estimated Dumped Goods as % of Country Total | Estimated Dumped Goods as % of Total Imports |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brazil | 46.8% | 98.1% | 45.9% |
| Russia | 32.7% | 83.8% | 27.4% |
| Total Brazil and Russia | 79.5% | 92.2% | 73.3% |
| USA | 20.3% | ||
| Other Imports | 0.2% | ||
| Total Imports | 100.00% |
Estimated Volume of Subsidized Goods as a Percentage of Total Imports
January 1, 2005 to June 30, 2006
| Country | % of Total Imports | Estimated Subsidized Goods as % of Country Total | Estimated Subsidized Goods as % of Total Imports |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brazil | 46.8% | 100.0% | 46.8% |
| Russia | 32.7% | ||
| USA | 20.3% | ||
| Other Imports | 0.2% | ||
| Total Imports | 100.00% |
| SIMA Registry and Disclosure Unit Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Program Trade Programs Directorate Canada Border Services Agency 100 Metcalfe Street, 11th Floor Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0L8 Canada |
|
| Telephone | Denis Chénier 613-954-7394 Vincent Gaudreau 613-954-7262 |
| simaregistry-depotlmsi@cbsa-asfc.gc.ca | |
| Fax | 613-948-4844 |
Web site |
Darwin Satherstrom
Acting Director General
Trade Programs Directorate
Evidence provided by the complainant suggests that the government of Brazil may have provided support to manufacturers of subject goods in the following manner. For purposes of this investigation, "Government of Brazil" (GB) refers to all levels of government, i.e. federal, state or municipal or any person, agency or institution operating under the authority of any of these governments.
There is information in GB publications that ACC is a type of special export financing by which the GB enables banks to finance exports prior to shipment at international interest rates. The complainant has characterized this program as a type of working capital loan program. The complainant has compared the ACC interest rates paid by the exporter as reported in the exporter’s public financial statements with the domestic working capital interest rates published by the Banco Central do Brasil, the Central Bank of Brazil, and arrived at a subsidy estimated at 3.93% of export price in 2003, 4.11% in 2004 and 1.71% in 2005.
The complainant has also alleged that the exporter deposits the funds received from allegedly preferential loans such ACCs and earns interest at rates significantly higher than the rates paid on the loans, interest that it would not otherwise earn. According to Nexans, the exporter obtains low interest working capital loans six months before export shipment, but working capital loans for copper rod are only normally required two months ahead of shipment or one month ahead of production. The evidence suggests that permitting the recipient to invest the funds and earn interest until such time as the working capital is required is an integral component of the program.
The CBSA acknowledges that the available evidence is not definitive regarding the role of the GB in respect of ACCs and, as such, the program will be investigated to ascertain the operation of this program and whether the GB is directly or indirectly involved in the provision of these loans.
In general, the provision of loans by a government constitutes a financial contribution under paragraph 2(1.6) of SIMA. A benefit is conferred to a recipient when a loan is provided at an interest rate that is less than that which the recipient could receive on a non-guaranteed domestic commercial loan, as calculated under sections 28 and 29 of the Special Import Measures Regulations (SIMR).
The alleged ACC subsidies may be specific as the available information suggests that these loans are available only to exporters. Under SIMA, a subsidy that is contingent in whole or in part on export performance constitutes an export subsidy that is deemed specific under paragraph 2(7.2) of SIMA.
In respect of the allegation regarding the investment of ACC loan funds and the interest earned on such investments constituting an amount of subsidy, the CBSA will examine this allegation in more detail during the course of the investigation.
The BNDES is a federal public company that is associated with the Brazilian Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade. There is information in GB publications that the BNDES provides loans to exporters to help their competitiveness. These loans may be provided directly or through banks accredited by the BNDES. Two of the banks listed by the BNDES are banks that provide financing to the exporter, possibly including the “pre-payment of exports” reported in the exporter’s financial statements. The complainant has compared the “pre-payment of exports” interest rates paid by the exporter with the domestic working capital interest rates published by the Central Bank of Brazil and arrived at a subsidy estimated at 0.18% of export price in 2003, 0.20% in 2004 and 0.52% in 2005.
The CBSA considers that the evidence sufficiently shows a likelihood that the exporter’s loans in “pre-payment of exports” are preferential loans provided by the GB, either directly by the BNDES or through accredited banks. The provision of loans by a government constitutes a financial contribution under paragraph 2(1.6) of SIMA. A benefit is conferred to a recipient when a loan is provided at an interest rate that is less than that which the recipient could receive on a non-guaranteed domestic commercial loan.
This alleged subsidy may be specific as the available information suggests that these loans are available only to exporters. Under SIMA, a subsidy that is contingent, in whole or in part, on export performance constitutes an export subsidy that is deemed specific under paragraph 2(7.2) of SIMA.
The complainant’s allegation of interest earned on preferential loan funds that are invested, outlined previously, will also be investigated in respect of this program.
There is information in GB publications that the BNDES maintains a number of schemes that facilitate access to credit including working capital associated with a fixed investment under certain conditions. These loans may be provided directly or through banks accredited by the BNDES. One of the banks listed by the BNDES is a bank that provides financing to the exporter, possibly including “working capital” reported in the exporter’s financial statements. The complainant has compared the “working capital” interest rates paid by the exporter with the domestic working capital interest rates published by the Central Bank of Brazil and arrived at a subsidy estimated at 0.63% of export price in 2004.
The CBSA considers that the evidence sufficiently shows a likelihood that the exporter’s “working capital” loans are preferential loans provided by the GB, either directly by the BNDES or through an accredited bank. The provision of loans by a government constitutes a financial contribution under paragraph 2(1.6) of SIMA. A benefit is conferred to a recipient when a loan is provided at an interest rate that is less than that which the recipient could receive on a non-guaranteed domestic commercial loan.
This alleged subsidy may be specific as the available information suggests that these loans are available only for eligible projects. Under SIMA, a subsidy that is limited in law or in fact to certain enterprises constitutes a subsidy under SIMA.
The complainant’s allegation of interest earned on preferential loan funds that are invested, outlined previously, will also be investigated in respect of this program.
The GB has identified the FINOR program as a subsidy in its Notification of subsidies to the World Trade Organization (WTO) dated October 20, 2005. Under FINOR, approved projects fostering the development of the Northeast Region receive financial assistance from this investment fund in the form of loans convertible into stock. The complainant has alleged that there might be a connection between this program and the exporter’s loans, in particular “working capital” shown on the exporter’s financial statements. The exporter is located in one of the states comprising the Northeast Region for purposes of FINOR and other subsidies as defined in the Notification to the WTO.
The complainant has compared the “working capital” interest rates paid by the exporter with the domestic working capital interest rates published by the Central Bank of Brazil and arrived at a subsidy estimated at 0.63% of export price in 2004.
The CBSA considers that the evidence sufficiently shows a likelihood that the exporter’s “working capital” loans and other financing are preferential loans provided by the GB under the FINOR program. The provision of loans by a government constitutes a financial contribution under paragraph 2(1.6) of SIMA. A benefit is conferred to a recipient when a loan is provided at an interest rate that is less than that which the recipient could receive on a non-guaranteed domestic commercial loan.
This alleged subsidy would be a specific subsidy for the reason that it is limited to enterprises located in the Northeast Region of Brazil.
The complainant’s allegation of interest earned on preferential loan funds that are invested, outlined previously, will also be investigated in respect of this program.
The GB has identified the FNE program as a subsidy in its Notification of subsidies to the WTO. Under FNE, enterprises carrying out activities in the Northeast Region may receive financial assistance from this fund in the form of loans backed by a “Constitutional Fund”. The complainant has alleged that there might be a connection between this program and the exporter’s loans, in particular “working capital” shown on the exporter’s financial statements. The exporter is located in one of the states comprising the Northeast Region for purposes of FNE and other subsidies as defined in the Notification to the WTO.
The complainant has compared the “working capital” interest rates paid by the exporter with the domestic working capital interest rates published by the Central Bank of Brazil and arrived at a subsidy estimated at 0.63% of export price in 2004.
The CBSA considers that the evidence sufficiently shows a likelihood that the exporter’s “working capital” loans and other financing are preferential loans provided by the GB under the FNE program. The provision of loans by a government constitutes a financial contribution under paragraph 2(1.6) of SIMA. A benefit is conferred to a recipient when a loan is provided at an interest rate that is less than that which the recipient could receive on a non-guaranteed domestic commercial loan.
This alleged subsidy would be a specific subsidy for the reason that it is limited to enterprises located in the Northeast Region of Brazil.
The complainant’s allegation of interest earned on preferential loan funds that are invested, outlined previously, will also be investigated in respect of this program.
There is information in a GB publication that FINEP is a program of grants and loans to companies involved in certain approved research projects. FINEP is run by the Brazilian Innovation Agency, which is subordinated to the Ministry of Science and Technology. The complainant has noted that the exporter reports financial assistance under this program in its financial statements.
Neither the complainant nor the CBSA could estimate the benefit to the exporter under this program. However, the CBSA will investigate this program in order to determine the nature of the assistance provided to the exporter and whether it is a specific subsidy in law or in fact.
The provision of grants and loans by a government constitutes a financial contribution under paragraph 2(1.6) of SIMA. In the case of loans, a benefit is conferred to a recipient when a loan is provided at an interest rate that is less than that which the recipient could receive on a non-guaranteed domestic commercial loan.
The GB has identified the SUDENE/ADENE program as a subsidy in its Notification of subsidies to the WTO. This is a program of income tax exemptions and reductions to provide assistance to enterprises in the Northeast Region. The Northeast Region includes the federal state where the exporter is located. The complainant has noted the amount of income tax exempted under this program in the exporter’s financial statements, and calculated the tax saving as a benefit of 0.78% of export price in 2003, 1.74% in 2004 and 1.41% in 2005.
Tax revenue that is exempted or reduced is considered a financial contribution under paragraph 2(1.6) of SIMA. In such a case, the benefit conferred to the recipient is equal to the amount of the reduction or exemption in the amount of tax payable by the recipient. This alleged subsidy would be a specific subsidy for the reason that it is limited to enterprises located in the Northeast Region of Brazil.
There is information that: COFINS and PIS are social contributions which all companies are required to pay; prior to February 1, 2004, COFINS was 3% and PIS 0.65% of gross domestic income; as of February 1, 2004, COFINS is 7.6% and PIS 1.65% of gross domestic income less inputs (i.e. of value-added); export sales are exempt from payment of COFINS/PIS.
The complainant has estimated this alleged export subsidy at 3.65% of export price, the total COFINS/PIS exemption in effect prior to February 1, 2004. For the period subsequent to February 1, 2004, the complainant has estimated the subsidy using the total of the new rates, 9.25%, applied to its estimate of the exporter’s value-added. Value-added was Nexans’ estimate of the exporter’s cost to transform refined copper to copper cathode and copper cathode to copper rod. Subsidy was thus estimated at 3.65% for 2003, 1.30% for 2004 and 1.05% for 2005.
The treatment of the alleged subsidy and the determination of the amount of subsidy, if any, will depend on the type of taxes that are imposed under COFINS/PIS.
There is information that COFINS resources finance health and social assistance activities and that PIS resources finance the unemployment insurance and minimum wage programs.
If COFINS/PIS are determined to constitute a direct tax (e.g. an income tax) or a social welfare charge, then the entire amount of the amount of the exemption will be determined to constitute a subsidy. Alternatively, if COFINS/PIS is determined to constitute an internal tax (i.e. an indirect tax levied on goods), the export subsidy would be any amount of exemption or remission that is in excess of that amount levied on domestic sales.
In either case, the exemption of companies from paying direct taxes or social welfare charges or the excessive relief of indirect taxes on exported goods, would constitute a financial contribution under paragraph 2(1.6) of SIMA. In such cases, the benefit conferred to the recipient is equal to the amount of exemption or excess relief in the amount of tax payable by the recipient. A subsidy that is contingent on export performance constitutes an export subsidy that is deemed specific under paragraph 2(7.2) of SIMA.
There is information in the public financial statements of the exporter that “the company obtained a preliminary order suspending the demandability of paying PIS and COFINS”. As export revenues are apparently exempt from COFINS/PIS, this further exemption would seem to apply to domestic revenues.
The amounts of unpaid COFINS/PIS by reason of this order could not be estimated. The CBSA will investigate this allegation to precisely determine the nature and effect of this suspension.
Revenue that is exempted is considered a financial contribution under paragraph 2(1.6) of SIMA. In such a case, the benefit conferred to the recipient is equal to the amount of the exemption in the amount of tax payable by the recipient. As it appears that it is “the company” that was granted this additional exemption, the CBSA views it likely that such is not generally available and constitutes a specific subsidy.
The exporter’s financial statements show that there were certain amounts of “assumed credits from the Tax on Industrialized Products - IPI (Brazilian Excise Tax) on the acquisition of raw material taxed at zero rate or not taxed”. There is information that exporters may receive an IPI Tax credit equal to 5.37% of the value of inputs used to produce exported goods in compensation for COFINS/PIS paid on inputs.
The CBSA is satisfied that there is a likelihood that the “assumed credits” as described in the exporter’s financial statements may be attributable in whole or in part to COFINS/PIS, that the exporter avails itself of the 5.37% credit and that the credit is excessive. This alleged subsidy is based on previous investigations by the United States Government that found that the assumed COFINS/PIS credits, deducted from IPI taxes due, were excessive.
The complainant has calculated this alleged subsidy to be 5.48% of export price. This was arrived at by applying the 5.37% credit on estimated raw material costs and expressing the result as a percentage of estimated export price. It is noted that the complainant’s estimated cost is higher than the estimated export price.
The CBSA notes that this estimate covers information concerning COFINS/PIS prior to February 1, 2004. The complainant could not estimate an amount of excessive credit under the new COFINS/PIS systems. The investigation will cover COFINS/PIS credits that the exporter may have been granted by the GB in respect of inputs to produce subject goods exported during the period of investigation.
Excessive relief of taxes on inputs contingent on the export of goods constitutes a financial contribution under paragraph 2(1.6) of SIMA. A subsidy that is contingent on export performance constitutes an export subsidy that is deemed specific under paragraph 2(7.2) of SIMA.
There is information that: the Contribuição social sobre o lucro (CSSL or CSL) is 9% of net profit and that the exporter received an exemption from paying CSSL; the GB, at the national and state level, provides incentives to exporters and to companies located in the Northeast Region in the form of tax relief.
The CBSA is satisfied that there is a likelihood that this exemption has been granted under a program that is not generally granted to all companies in Brazil.
The amount of unpaid CSSL by reason of this exemption was calculated at 9% of the net profits reported by the exporter. The exempted amounts resulted in an estimated subsidy of 0.56% of export price in 2004 and 0.21% in 2005.
The exemption of revenues constitutes a financial contribution under paragraph 2(1.6) of SIMA. This alleged subsidy would be a specific subsidy for the reason that it is export-contingent, limited to enterprises located in the Northeast Region of Brazil or otherwise not generally available. The exempted amounts would fall under subsection 27.1(2) of the SIMR that stipulates that any amount owing and due to a government that is exempted shall be treated as a grant.
There is information that: CPMF is assessed on financial transactions at the rate of 0.38%; the exporter received an “order suspending the payment of CPMF”; the GB, at the national and state level, provides incentives to exporters and to companies located in the Northeast Region in the form of tax relief.
The CBSA is satisfied that there is a likelihood that this exemption has been granted under a program that is not generally granted to all companies in Brazil.
The amount of unpaid CPMF by reason of this suspension order was calculated as the difference between the accrued amount reported in the exporter’s financial statements one year and the accrued amount reported for the previous year. The amounts were expressed as a percentage of total sales, resulting in an estimated subsidy of 0.31% of export price in 2004 and 0.36% in 2005.
The exemption of revenues constitutes a financial contribution under paragraph 2(1.6) of SIMA. This alleged subsidy would be a specific subsidy for the reason that it is export-contingent, limited to enterprises located in the Northeast Region of Brazil or otherwise not generally available. The exempted amounts would fall under subsection 27.1(2) of the SIMR that stipulates that any amount owing and due to a government that is exempted shall be treated as a grant.
There is information that the GB, at the national and state level, provides incentives to exporters, certain industrial sectors and to companies located in the Northeast Region in the form of preferential loans as well as duty and tax relief including: preferential loans in pre-payment of exports under Brazil’s Export Exchange Regulations; suspension of COFINS/PIS payable by exporters on capital goods and imported machinery; preferential capital goods depreciation for income tax purposes for companies in the Northeast; BNDES, FINAME and ADENE support for mining enterprises; export credit and buyer’s credit under BNDES-EXIM and PROEX programs; incentives available from the state in which the exporter is located including ICMS state tax reductions for the metallurgy sector.
1. WTO, New and Full Notification Pursuant to Article XVI:1 of the GATT 1994 and Article 25 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Brazil, Doc. G/SCM/N/123/BRA (20 October 2005).
2. WTO, Trade Policy Review, Brazil, Doc. WT/TPR/S/140 (1 November 2004).
3. United States Department of Commerce, Import Administration, Electronic Subsidies Enforcement Library, Brazil, General, http://ia.ata.doc.gov/esel/brazil/02-830a.html, Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the Countervailing Duty Investigation of Carbon and Certain Alloy Steel Wire Rod from Brazil, August 23, 2002.
4. Canadian International Trade Tribunal:
- NQ-92-009, certain cold-rolled sheet from Germany, France, Italy, the UK and US, Statement of Reasons August 13, 1993, page 20:
“Consistent with previous decisions, the Tribunal determined that both internally transferred goods for further manufacture (furtherance) and goods sold in the Canadian market must be considered part of the domestic production for purposes of its injury inquiry. In determining if dumping caused material injury, however, the Tribunal focused principally on those indicators relating to sales in the domestic market. They include trends and levels of imports and market shares, prices and financial performance.”
- NQ-99-003, certain contrast media from the US, Statement of Reasons May 16, 2000, page 19:
“In the Tribunal’s view, the effects of the domestic industry’s export performance, albeit favourable, does not negate the material injury caused directly by the dumping of the subject goods through price erosion and lost sales in the domestic market.”
- NQ-2004-006, certain laminate flooring from Austria, Belgium, China, France, Germany and Poland, Statement of Reasons, June 30, 2005, paragraph 87:
“In this case, as will be discussed later in this statement of reasons, the Tribunal determined that Uniboard’s injury in the domestic market, which was caused by the dumping and subsidizing of the subject goods, was material, even while it enjoyed some success in the export market.”